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ii 
The Utah State Bar's Office of Professional Conduct ("OPC") hereby 
submits its Reply Brief pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Doncouse's Brief Fails to Conform to the Requirements of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Doncouse's Brief does not conform with the basic requirements of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and applicable case law interpreting those 
rules.1 The rules provide that "References shall be made to the pages of the 
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11 (b) . . . ." Rule 24(b), Utah R. 
App. Pro. They also provide that a briefs argument section "shall contain" the 
"parts of the record relied on." Rule 24(a)(9), Utah. R. App. Pro.; see also 
Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co.. 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) ("This 
Court need not, and will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or 
supported by, the record."). Doncouse's brief has no references to the record. 
Moreover, Doncouse's brief sets forth numerous factual contentions for 
which there is no support at all in the trial record. Examples of this include most 
of Doncouse's statements about his personal circumstances, the advice he 
allegedly received concerning his physical and mental condition, the progressive 
nature of his health problems, and so on. See e.g. Doncouse's Brief at 2, ^ [3; at 
3 H6. Although Doncouse's testimony touched briefly upon matters such as his 
difficulties in practice in 1999—well before the conduct in issue in the contempt 
1
 Doncouse also failed to serve the OPC two copies of his brief, as required by 
Rule 26; nor was the brief he served bound or printed on both sides of the paper. 
See Rule 26(b), Utah R. App. Pro; Rule 27(c), Utah R. App. Pro. 
-i 
proceedings that underly this appeal—there was no testimony or other evidence 
presented about his current medical and psychological diagnoses and what 
bearing, if any, these had upon his misconduct. (R. 146-161) During closing 
argument, Doncouse merely stated that some of his alleged conditions may have 
had something to do with his contempt of court in a couple of instances, but not 
all of them. (R. 201-205) 
Additionally, many of Doncouse's unsupported statements of fact are 
irrelevant to these proceedings, particularly those concerning the period before 
his initial discipline. See e.g. Doncouse's Brief at 2,1(2. 
Doncouse's brief is likewise devoid of legal analysis with appropriate 
citations to authorities, which are also required. See Rule 24(a)(9), Utah R. App. 
Pro.; State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1998) ("A brief must contain 
some support for each contention."). 
II. Doncouse's Arguments Are Predicated Upon a Mistaken 
Characterization of the Facts and an Incorrect View of the Purpose of 
Disciplinary Proceedings 
In section I of his Argument, Doncouse agrees that a more severe penalty 
than the original suspension he received is called for, but states that the 
questions he raised about his physical health and mental state "were a proper 
factor for consideration in applying] sanctions under Rule 3.1(b) and therein 
evidence pertinent to the court's exercise of applying mitigating factors in the 
case at bar." Doncouse's Brief at 14-15. 
The District Court did not, however, employ as a mitigating factor 
Doncouse's impairment. Indeed, the District Court explicitly rejected it, finding 
that "Impairment was not a mitigating factor because although there was 
2 
testimony concerning some of Doncouse's medical conditions, these do not 
appear to be causally related in any way to the violations." (R. 206) Moreover, 
Doncouse himself stated during closing argument, "I do not believe that these 
things mitigate what had been mitigated to the point of excuse." (R. 198) The 
District Court noted that everyone has problems, and invited Doncouse to 
demonstrate that there was a causal relationship between his difficulties and his 
contempt. (R. 201) Doncouse merely stated that depressive disorders affect 
memory loss, and that he stopped practicing some years before because of bi-
polar disorder, but this had no bearing on his conduct at the prison. (R. 201-203) 
This did not arise to the level of mental or physical problems that mitigate 
contempt of court, and the District Court correctly declined to view them as such. 
In section II of his Argument, Doncouse contends that a one-year 
suspension is the appropriate discipline for his misconduct. See Doncouse's 
Brief at 15. In lieu of citing any supporting authority for this, Doncouse merely 
states that this is the amount of time he needs to evaluate his situation. He adds, 
"the sanction itself judiciously meets the requirements of justice in meting out 
punishment for acts outside the standards set for those empowered with the 
responsibility of serving the public in the capacity of a licensed attorney in the 
State of Utah." Id. 
The purpose of lawyer sanctions is not, however, to punish attorneys, nor 
is a suspension or disbarment imposed for the purpose of an attorney's reflective 
self-assessment of his or her continued will or capacity to resume practice. 
Instead, lawyer disciplinary proceedings are "to ensure and maintain the high 
standard of professional conduct required of those who undertake the discharge 
of professional responsibilities as lawyers and to protect the public and the 
administration of justice from those who have demonstrated by their conduct that 
they are unable or unlikely to properly discharge their professional 
responsibilities." Rule 1(a), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. ("RLDD"); 
see also Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions ("Standards"). 
Conclusion 
The discipline system employs increasingly serious sanctions as a means 
of ensuring and maintaining the high standard of professional conduct expected 
of attorneys. Doncouse was suspended for professional misconduct, but 
continued to practice law, and filed a sworn statement that falsely assured the 
District Court of his compliance with the order of suspension. Under these 
circumstances, disbarment appears to be the next step in furtherance of 
protecting the public and the administration of justice. The OPC therefore urges 
the Court to reverse the decision of the District Court, and to remand the case for 
entry of an order of disbarment. 
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